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One of the greatest barriers to meaningful debate within and about economics has been the 
successful mainstream rhetoric that economics is a technical subject. Where economics is 
presented as a science, ethical considerations are deemed to belong to non-science. According to 
this view, the economist’s role is to produce technical results to be handed over as expert advice 
to policy makers, for them to use according to their (separable) ethical principles. Where the 
issue of ethics has arisen within mainstream academic economics, it has tended to refer to the 
kind of generic academic ethics applied by funding bodies, employers of consultants and 
publication outlets: not to plagiarise, to declare conflicts of interest, not to be abusive, and so on. 
While important in themselves, these are ethics of personal behaviour which are considered to be 
independent of research methodology and research content. 
But ethical responsibilities have come to the fore in public discourse in the wake of the recent 
financial and economic crisis. Given the real consequences of the crisis and their uneven 
distribution, questions arise as to how far economists are morally culpable. Not only did 
mainstream economists fail to alert the authorities to the forces leading towards crisis, but their 
theories had equipped financial market players with the technical skills to stoke the system’s 
vulnerability to crisis. Moral issues continue to arise, given the policy advice in favour of fiscal 
austerity which came from the same economists. The nature and role of expert advice raise moral 
issues surrounding the status of economic knowledge itself. 
There is clearly more scope for ethical issues to arise in economics than implied by narrow 
generic academic ethics. In order to consider this scope we raise issue with the notion of 
economics as a purely technical discipline and explore the implications for ethics in relation to 
economics as a whole and in relation to the responsibilities of individual economists. There has 
for some time been growing academic interest in considering ethics and economics in this wider 
sense, such that there is now a body of resources by which to address these issues, such as the 
Handbook of Economics and Ethics (Peil and van Staveren, eds, 2009). Meanwhile, George De 
Martino (2011) had spearheaded discussion of the possibility that economists, like other 
professional groupings, might be required to sign an oath which established ethical standards. A 
range of perspectives on such a possibility and related issues was published in the Oxford 
Handbook on Professional Economic Ethics (De Martino and McCloskey, eds, 2016).  
Ethical issues enter at the level of how economic knowledge is produced. Where mainstream 
economics textbooks refer at all to methodology, it is to a logical positivist approach whereby 
economists derive positive propositions and test them against independent facts. While Hume 
had simply pointed out the distinction between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ statements, modern mainstream 
economists assert that economics is only concerned with the former (see further van de Laar and 
Peil 2009 and Davis 2016). It is not that economists do not seek to contribute to the betterment of 
society – most do – but rather that this is to be done by producing useful, empirically-validated 
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positive statements.1 The resulting methodology is seen as defining the discipline, effectively 
ruling out other approaches. 
But modern economics began, with Hume among others, as a moral science within the field of 
moral philosophy; ethics were integral to economic reasoning (Dow 2009). It is not then a 
question of whether it is desirable to strip economics of ethics, but rather whether it is actually 
possible to do so. As Kayatekin (2014: 605) argues with respect to Hume: ‘to the extent 
economic behaviour is determined by passions such as greed, benevolence and pleasure, we 
cannot separate economic activity and morality’. The theoretical framework itself determines 
how values are discussed. Thus ethical concepts such as trust and moral hazard are analysed in 
mainstream theory in terms of incentives and self-interest, while elsewhere they are analysed in 
terms of institutions and social conventions (Nooteboom 2009, Dow 2012). Inevitably policy 
advice too is formulated in terms of the framework employed, an important issue for example for 
banking reform in the wake of the crisis. 
Ethical judgements are thus embedded even in apparently-technical mainstream models, and in 
concepts such as efficiency (van Staveren 2009). Within a mainstream framework, market 
competition is presumed to ensure that labour and capital are paid the value of their marginal 
product, justifying the pattern of income distribution, for example. Similarly, mainstream theory 
supports promotion of free trade on the grounds that it produces a net increase in welfare, i.e. 
where losers could in principle be compensated by winners, even if compensation does not 
actually take place. The embeddedness of moral values is even more apparent beyond the 
mainstream, where market forces are analysed as being as much matters of power and social 
convention as they are about price incentives.  
This brings us to the ethics of the economist herself, as researcher, as teacher, as consultant and 
as policy adviser. The first implication of economics being a moral science is that it is unethical 
to present economic propositions as separable from ethics (Dow 2015). Theory is contestable, 
not just in relation to alternatives, but also in relation to its moral presuppositions. It is therefore 
incumbent on the economist to be explicit about the ethics embedded in her theorising and to be 
prepared to engage in debate about them. But the responsibility extends further to being open 
about the limitations of any one approach to economics. This requires the economist to be 
prepared to explain and defend her approach relative to alternatives. 
Unfortunately the mainstream approach to economics as a technical subject precludes debate 
about ethical presuppositions as irrelevant. Yet logical positivism can no longer be sustained in 
economics (just as the philosophy of science has long since left it behind). This is not just 
because theory is imbued with ethics; it is also a matter of epistemology. If the subject matter of 
economics is complex and evolving, no one approach can hope to deal with the whole. Where 
knowledge is uncertain, and different understandings are possible, pluralism provides the most 
robust disciplinary strategy. Different groupings of economists focus on particular aspects of that 
complexity according to their ontology, and understand evidence in their own way (Dow 2004). 
                                                          
1 Waterman (1994) explores the efforts in the nineteenth century to develop positive economics to supplant 
normative political economy. 
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If the truth of propositions cannot be demonstrated, but is rather a matter of persuasion, the 
economist has a much broader ethical responsibility than simply revealing the values embedded 
in theory, challenging though that is (Dow 2016). To engage in honest debate with other 
researchers, and as a consultant or policy adviser, the economist has a moral responsibility to 
acknowledge the limitations of her knowledge, and to explain and defend her approach relative 
to others. The same moral responsibility applies to the economist as teacher. To educate young 
scholars to be morally responsible economists in the face of  epistemic challenges, the economics 
teacher needs to equip them to understand and choose between different approaches.  
According to this type of analysis, the moral opprobrium in which economists were held after the 
crisis was due to a number of ethical blind spots: economic arguments were presented as 
definitive, without the show of modesty more appropriate given the epistemological challenges; 
the arguments were presented as technical, as if there was no ethical content; the responsibility 
was not recognised to be transparent about ethical content; and the responsibility was not 
recognised to explain and defend the chosen approach in relation to alternative approaches. 
Rather than retreating into an unsustainable defense that economics is scientific and therefore 
free of ethical considerations, economists should aim to rebuild trust in the profession by 
accepting that more robust knowledge will arise from addressing the ethical content of the 
subject and opening it up to debate. The professional ethic of tolerance of different approaches is 
critical. But non-mainstream economics, with its openness to addressing ethical issues, needs to 
be recognised by the mainstream as economics. The epistemological argument for pluralism 
needs to be accepted for the principle of tolerance to have substance.     
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